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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD D. COLEY,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

Case No. 910419

vs.
Case No. 900446-CA

NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
AND OPINION DATED AUGUST 15, 1991

COMES NOW Defendant and Respondent, by and through counsel,
and responds to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari as
follows.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
filing a

Defendant instituted this action by

"Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause" against

Plaintiff on or about February 21, 1990 (Record at 213). In the
"Verified Motion" Defendant alleged:
a)
That numerous judgments had been entered against
Plaintiff for failure to pay child support. (Record at
213).

b)
That Plaintiff had been held in contempt of court
and had served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail for
his contempt. (Record at 214).
c)
That Plaintiff still demanded his visitation rights
with the parties' minor daughter after his release from
jail. (Record at 214).
d)
That the trial court should again sentence Plaintiff
to serve time in the Salt Lake County Jail for his
continued failure to pay child support and his continued
contempt of court. (Record at 214).
e)
That the trial court should suspend Plaintiff's
visitation rights with the parties' minor daughter for
his continued contempt of court. (Record at 214).
Disposition in the Lower Court.

A hearing was held on

Defendant's Order to Show Cause on June 18, 1990 in the Third
District Court.

Evidence was proffered by counsel for Defendant

and Plaintiff was called to testify.

Judge James S. Sawaya found

that Plaintiff was in contempt and ordered Plaintiff's visitation
terminated until further order of the court and sentenced Plaintiff
to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail, however,
the jail sentence was suspended.

(Record at 262). An Order was

signed by Judge Sawaya on July 13, 1990, (Record 268-271), and an
Amended Order was entered by Judge Sawaya on January 9, 1991. On
August 15, 1991 the Court of Appeals upheld the Amended Order of
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" (p. 4 through 11 of

Petition for Writ of Certiorari), consists of approximately 40
2

paragraphs that, collectively, are somewhat true but are generally
misleading and slanted according to Plaintiff's pro-se and nonlegal approach to his own case.

Rather than challenge the truth

and veracity of Plaintiff's representations of fact, Defendant
elects to set forth her own version of the pertinent facts as
follows.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on September 8,

1982 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

(Decree, Record at 12-14).

Plaintiff was ordered to pay

child support in the amount of $250.00 per month for the parties'
minor child until said child reached age 21.
3.

(Record at 13).

Since the entry of the Decree, Defendant has brought

numerous motions for orders to show cause against Plaintiff for
child support arrearages, payment of medical expenses, for the
timely payment of child support, etc..1

November 17, 1982, judgment entered in the amount of
$1,750.00. (Record at 24-25).
February 7, 1984, judgment entered in the amount of
$1,880.14. (Record at 53-55, 65-67)
April 22, 1986, judgment entered in the amount of
$5,471.00, combining all previous judgments. (Record at 95-99)
October 27, 1988, judgment entered in the amount of
$10,001.24. (Record at 173-177)
July 13, 1990, judgment entered in the amount of
$27,365.76 combining all previous judgments plus interest. (Record
at 268-271)
3

4.

On December 3, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was held

before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court, on the
issue of Plaintiff's contempt of court for failing to pay court
ordered child support.
5.

On December 16, 1988, an Order was entered finding

Plaintiff in contempt of court and sentencing Plaintiff to thirty
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail.
6.

(Record at 188-193).

On January 24, 1989, Plaintiff, having failed to purge

the contempt, was ordered (in court) to surrender himself to the
Salt Lake County Jail on January 27, 1989 for a period of thirty
(30) days.
7.

(Record at 212).

On January 27, 1989, Plaintiff failed to report at the

jail as ordered and a bench warrant was issued against Plaintiff
on February 6, 1989.
8.

(Record at 211).

Plaintiff left the State of Utah for several months

(Hearing Transcript, June 18, 1990, pp. 10-12, 15-21) and upon his
return to Utah he was arrested and served his jail sentence during
November, 1989.
9.

On February 21, 1990, Defendant filed a Verified Motion

for Order to Show Cause, (Record at 213-215), requesting judgment
for child support arrearages, for Plaintiff to be sentenced to jail
for continued contempt and for Plaintiff's visitation with the
parties' minor child to be suspended.

On May 7, 1990, Defendant

filed an Affidavit in Support of said Motion. (Record at 222-233).

4

10.

On June 18, 1990, Defendant's Order to Show Cause was

heard by Judge Sawaya.

Plaintiff

testimony was proffered by counsel.

testified

and Defendant's

Based upon the evidence

presented, Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in continuing contempt of
court and ordered Plaintiff to serve thirty (30) days in jail and
suspended Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child.
(Record at 262).
11.

On July 13, 1990, an Order was entered against Plaintiff

for child support arrearages2, for continued contempt of court, and
suspending Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child.
(Record at 268-271).
12.

On July 16# 1990, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Bias

or Prejudice (Record at 272-284) and on July 20, 1990 Plaintiff
filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice (Record at 299304).
13.

On August 1 # 1990, Judge Sawaya entered a Minute Entry

stating "the Court having reviewed the Affidavit of Bias or
Prejudice

in

the

above

entitled

matter

and

questions

its

sufficiency and orders the same referred to Judge Murphy for his
determination."
14.

(Record at 313).

On August 1, 1990, Judge Michael R. Murphy entered an

Order stating Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice lacked

2

Judgment was entered for $27,365.76 (including interest and
minimal attorney fees).
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legal sufficiency and that Judge Sawaya would remain assigned to
the case.
15.

(Record at 314-315).
On August 13, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of

the July 13, 1990 Order of Judge Sawaya and the August 7, 1990
Order of Judge Murphy.
16.

(Record at 316).

On October 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals vacated the

portion of the July 13, 1990 Order denying Plaintiff contact with
the parties' minor child and temporarily remanded to the district
court for additional findings on the issue of the best interest of
the child.

The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction to review

any new orders.
17.

(Record at 332-333).

On December 11, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law were signed by Judge Sawaya pertaining to the July 13, 1990
Order.
18.

On January 9, 1991 an Amended Order was entered by Judge

Sawaya in accordance with the Findings and Conclusions of December
11, 1990.
19.

Plaintiff appealed the Amended Order to the Court of

Appeals.
20.

On August 14, 1991 the Court of Appeals heard oral

argument pursuant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
21.

On August 15 1991 the Court of Appeals upheld the January

9, 1991 Amended Order of the district court.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals properly considered the constitutionality
of the trial court's order suspending Plaintiff's visitation.
Judge Sawaya found that Plaintiff's non-payment of child
support was willful and contumacious and that it was in the best
interest of the minor child not to have visitation with Plaintiff.
The district court did not err in conditioning the restoration
of visitation rights upon compliance with support orders.
U.C.A. §78-32-10 does not prevent the district court from
restricting visitation privileges, if the court finds that the
restriction is in the best interests of the child.
An order to show cause proceeding is proper for the purpose
of suspending and/or terminating Plaintiff's visitation.
The district court can sign an order, even though objections
have been filed, if the district court finds the objections have
no merit.
The Court of Appeals' use of Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure was proper.

ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
SUSPENDING PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION.

The Court of Appeals properly considered the Plaintiff's
constitutional
Plaintiff's

arguments

visitation

with

respect

privileges.
7

to

the

Plaintiff

suspension
states

of

in his

Petition (p. 11) that "there is a constitutional right of a parent
to maintain a personal and close relationship with their [sic]
children" and cites to several cases to support his position.
(Interest of Walter B. . 577 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1978); Mever vs.
Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, L.Ed. 1042 (1923);
and In Re J.P. . 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

All of these cases

involve the termination of parental rights.

Plaintiff's reliance

on these cases is flawed for two reasons:

first, the cases are

limited in scope to permanent termination of parental rights while
the case at hand is far more limited in that Judge Sawaya merely
suspended

Plaintiff's

visitation

until

he

exhibits

behavior

consistent with the best interests of his daughter and, second,
Plaintiff's cases are cited out-of-context of the law governing
suspension of visitation rights because there are numerous cases
that empower a court to restrict or suspend visitation rights under
certain fact situations.
This case is not about permanently terminating Plaintiff's
parental rights; it is about a parent's responsibility to help his
ex-wife raise their child.

Plaintiff may think that because his

ex-wife has a home and employment —

and because his daughter gets

fed, clothed and cared for without him assisting —

that this is

just a case of legal semantics where he can play lawyer and spend
countless

hours

trying

to

legally

financially support his daughter.

justify

why

he

does

not

However, this is a case where,

as Judge Sawaya found, Plaintiff's failure to pay child support is
8

willful and contumacious.

It does not take a legal scholar to

rightly conclude that a man who willfully refuses to support his
child does not have her best interest at heart or in mind.
Plaintiff argues that the Amended Order violates the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as it constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.

There are several cases (infra) in which

visitation has been suspended or conditioned.

Plaintiff's only

support for his argument that suspension of visitation amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment is his own subjective belief that it
does.
The credibility of Plaintiff's argument, that the Amended
Order destroys a loving relationship, is undermined by the fact
that Plaintiff, of his own accord, willfully refuses to financially
support his child and he physically had no contact with her, of his
own choice, between February, 1989 until after November, 1989.
(See Defendant's Statement of Fact #8).

2.

JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S NON-PAYMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS
AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD NOT TO HAVE VISITATION
WITH PLAINTIFF.

It should first be noted that Defendant's citation to the
transcript of the August 14, 1991 hearing before the Court of

9

Appeals3 is improper because no such transcript was prepared by
the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff's quote from hearing is taken out
of context and should not be relied upon by this Court as it is a
self-serving

statement

which

has

nothing

to

do

with

these

proceedings.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Sawaya suspended his visitation
for the sole reason that Plaintiff is willfully not paying his
court-ordered child support. The Findings of Fact# Conclusions of
Law and Amended Order clearly takes into consideration the best
interest of the child as required under Rohr vs. Rohr. 709 P. 2d 382
(Utah 1985).4
The Lunsford, Slade. West, Soderburg, Smith, and Dana cases,
cited by Plaintiff, are erroneously utilized by Plaintiff; the
portions of those cases that he refers to are taken out of context.
(Due to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 50(b) limitations,
a detailed discussion of these cases is included in the Appendix
hereto; these pages are copies from the Defendant's Court of
Appeals Response Brief).

"It should be noted at this point that respondent has
admittedly abandoned the claim that the petitioner is unfit in
anyway or degree except nonpayment of child support, (p. 23 lines
14-21 of Transcript of Oral Argument of August 14, 1991)."
[See Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari pg. 13].
4

... where the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay child
support is contumacious, or willful and intentional, and not due
to inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or denied,
if the welfare of the child so requires. Rohr (p.383).
10

In the case at hand, The Plaintiff has failed to provide
support for his daughter for several years except when faced with
jail.

The only actions which have prompted payments by Plaintiff

have been jail sentences, yet after serving the first jail
sentence, Plaintiff still made no child support payments until
faced with a second jail sentence.

In suspending Plaintiff's

visitation for a period of time, Judge Sawaya is trying to help
Plaintiff

realize

and

understand

that he

(Plaintiff) has a

responsibility to support his daughter.
Therefore, the Amended Order did not suspend Plaintiff's
visitation for the sole reason of non-payment of support.
At this point, a review of Rohr is appropriate. The facts in
Rohr and the facts in the present case are compared as follows:
1.

Amount of Father's Child-Support Arrearage. At the

time the issue of suspending visitation came before the
district court, the amount of the father's child-support
delinquency was:

2.

a.

In Rohr:

$2,400.

Id. at 383.

b.

In Coley: $27,305.00

(Amended Order).

Number of Child-Support Judgments Against Father.

At the time the issue of suspending visitation came
before

the

district

court, the

court

had

entered

judgments for child support against the father:
a.

In Rohr:

Not apparent from case test.

b.

In Coley: 4 previous times.
11

(Record at 223).

3.

Conditions on Restoration of Visitation,

At the

time the issue of suspending visitation came before the
district

court,

the

district

court

conditioned

restoration of visitation upon:
a.

In Rohr: Payment of all arrearages
of
alimony,
child
support,
attorney's fees and costs, at which
time the court would determine what
visitation would be appropriate.
Id. at 383.

b.

In Coley: Payment of $450 per month
for 4 consecutive months (i.e.
ongoing support of $250 per month
and payment of $200 per month toward
the arrearage judgment of $27,305.00
which was accruing interest of
$273.05 per month at the rate of 12%
per annum post-judgment interest.)

This Court then held that the following principles of law
applied to the Rohr facts:
1.

"A court may not deny the noncustodial parent

visitation rights for the mere failure to pay child
support, where the failure to pay is due to an inability
to pay.11

In the present case, Judge Sawaya found that

Plaintiff had the ability to earn income (Findings of
Fact #6 and Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order
to Show Cause) and that Plaintiff's failure to pay was
willful

and

contumacious

(Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law #1 Re: Amended Order on Order to Show
Cause).
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2.

lf

[W]here the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay

child support is willful and intentional, and not due to
inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or
denied, if the welfare of the child so requires" and "the
conduct of the father [sic] as it affects the child's
welfare is a proper consideration of the trial court."
In the present case, Judge Sawaya made the following
findings with respect to the requirement "if the welfare
of the child so requires" and as to "the conduct of the
father as it affects the child's welfare":
a.

Plaintiff does not respect the legal
system. (Findings of Fact #12).

b.

Plaintiff's attitudes and behaviors
are anti-social and constitute a
substantial deviation from the moral
norms of society. (Findings of Fact
#12).

c.

Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes
are not a proper example for his
child. (Findings of Fact #12).

d*

Plaintiff lacks concern for the
child's
financial
welfare.
(Conclusions of Law).

Plaintiff's

visitation

was

suspended

to

impress

upon

Plaintiff a sense of responsibility for the welfare of his child,
and the district court found that until Plaintiff felt such a
responsibility it was not in the daughter's best interest to have
visitation with Plaintiff.

13

3.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDITIONING
THE RESTORATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDERS.

The Plaintiff seems to argue that Rohr prohibited Judge Sawaya
from conditioning the restoration of visitation rights upon payment
of child support.

(Petition for Writ, p. 16-17).

The quotation that Plaintiff inserts from Rohr does not
support his contention. The language Plaintiff quotes referred to
the Rohr trial court requiring payment of all back alimony, child
support, attorney's fees and costs before the trial court would
consider a modification of the divorce decree.
In the present case, the Amended Order does not in any way
restrict

Plaintiff

from

petitioning

the

trial

court

for

a

modification of the divorce decree and it does not require payment
of all back child support, interest and attorney fees prior to
restoration of visitation.

The Amended Order provides Plaintiff

with a means of restoring his visitation.

Rohr did not prohibit

Judge Sawaya from requiring Plaintiff to pay his ongoing child
support of $250 per month and $200 per month toward the judgment
of $27,305.00.5

The purpose of Judge Sawaya's ruling was to

convert Plaintiff from a willful non-payer of support to a willful
payer of support.

The Judge's experience with Plaintiff —

is clear from the record —

which

was that Plaintiff did not pay child

support and his failure to pay was willful. When found in contempt
5

Post-judgment interest at 12% per annum was accruing on
that judgment in the amount of approximately $273.05 per month.
14

of court in 1989 for not paying child support, Plaintiff still did
not pay.

The first time he paid any support, following the 1989

hearings, was on the eve of going to jail. After serving the jail
sentence, Plaintiff still did not pay until he was again brought
before Judge Sawaya in 1990 and faced with the prospect of going
to jail and losing his visitation.

At that time, Plaintiff was

again found in contempt of court and sentenced to jail, but Judge
Sawaya gave Plaintiff two payment options: $50 a week to stay out
of jail or $450 a month for four consecutive months to both stay
out of jail and to have his visitation restored.

Plaintiff has

elected the first option and has ignored the second option.

With

respect to the first option, Plaintiff has seldom paid on a weekly
basis.

Judge Sawaya exercised proper judicial discretion in

fashioning a contempt order designed to impress upon Plaintiff his
responsibility to financially support his daughter, and an order
that would allow him to get on with his visitation schedule in a
matter of four short months.

4.

U.C.A §78-32-10 DOES NOT PREVENT THE DISTRICT
COURT FROM RESTRICTING A PARENT'S VISITATION
PRIVILEGES IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
RESTRICTION IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD.

Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay
the court ordered child support and sentenced Plaintiff to thirty
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail.

15

That sentence was

suspended with the condition that Plaintiff make $50.00 per week
installment payments.
Plaintiff's visitation rights were also suspended because the
trial court found it was not in the best interest of the child to
have visitation with her father at this time.

Plaintiff's

visitation was also suspended based on the trial court believing,
based on the history of the case, that it would take more than a
jail sentence to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of responsibility
for the welfare of his child.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Reardon vs. Reardon, 415 P.2d
571, 574 (Ariz. App. 1966) stated:
Support payments, however, are provided for
the benefit of the minor children and when
considering the history of the matter, the age
of the children, the past conduct of the noncustodial parent in exercising rights of
visitation, and the possible ineffectiveness
of the court contempt power, the trial court
could properly find that the children will
benefit by conditioning visitation privileges
upon payment of support (emphasis added).
In the case at hand, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty (30)
days in the Salt Lake County Jail in early 1989 and served that
sentence in approximately November of 1989.

Between that time

(November, 1989) and the filing of Defendant's Order to Show Cause
in April 1990, Plaintiff made no efforts to pay ongoing child
support nor did he make any attempt to reduce the arrearages.
Judge Sawaya knowing this, not only found Plaintiff in contempt
again but, based on the history of the case and the nominal effect
16

the last jail term had on Plaintiff, also decided that further
measures were needed to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of
responsibility for his daughter's welfare.

(See Reardon at 574).

The Arizona Court in Reardon further stated:
Nothing we say herein should be construed by
parties litigant that they may assume the
burden upon themselves of denying rights of
visitation conditioned on payment of support
monies without a court order. This is a power
that the court only may have and it is basic
that the parties themselves do not have the
authority to so modify the orders of the
court. (Id at 574).
Trial courts have the authority to suspend visitation. In the case
at hand, Judge Sawaya did not abuse any of the powers which have
been vested in him by the State of Utah.

Judge Sawaya was simply

fashioning an order to try and bring home to Plaintiff a sense of
responsibility for the welfare of his daughter —

knowing that if

he can convince Plaintiff that Plaintiff has that responsibility,
and that if Plaintiff will perform that responsibility, the overall
long-term relationship between that father and child will be
enhanced and strengthened.

5.

AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING IS PROPER FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SUSPENDING AND/OR TERMINATING
PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in "denying
visitation" in the absence of a petition for modification.

The

trial court's power includes the power to suspend and/or terminate
Plaintiff's visitation rights without modifying the divorce decree.
17

The trial court can impose restrictions upon existing rights if the
trial court determines that such is necessary to compel a party's
performance of an obligation.

Plaintiff's reliance on Rohr is

misplaced because, in that case, the wife petitioned to modify the
decree permanently. In the present case, Defendant's Order to Show
Cause was

not

visitation.

intended

to permanently

deprive

Plaintiff

of

The intention of the Order to Show Cause, and the

resulting Amended Order, was to temporarily suspend Plaintiff's
visitation in order to impress upon him his responsibility for his
daughter's care, support and welfare, and the resulting Amended
Order gave Plaintiff an avenue whereby he could quickly re-instate
his decree-awarded visitation rights.

6.

THE DISTRICT COURT CAN SIGN AN ORDER EVEN
THOUGH OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IF THE
DISTRICT COURT FINDS THE OBJECTIONS HAVE NO
MERIT.

Nothing

in Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration, which is cited in Plaintiff's Brief, indicates that
even though objections to an order have been filed that the judge
cannot go ahead and sign the order over the objections.

The Rule

only states that a party must file their objections within five (5)
days after receiving the proposed order. Further, Plaintiff cites
no evidence

that

Judge

Sawaya

failed

to

review

objections before signing the July 13, 1990 Order.

Plaintiff's

Assuming that

Plaintiff's objections were received by Judge Sawaya on July 11,
18

1990, as Plaintiff says, Judge Sawaya had three days, before he
signed the July 13, 1990 Order, to review Plaintiff's objections.
Plaintiff has failed to support his position that the trial
court erred by signing the Order over his objections.

7.

THE COURT OF APPEALS USE OF RULE 31 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE WAS PROPER.

The Court of Appeals use of Rule 31 was proper in that the
whole basis of Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred was
that its reliance upon Rohr was improper.

The Court of Appeals

found that the trial court abided by the guidelines set forth in
Rohr and that a written decision on this matter would not add
anything to the current law.
If a decision truly adds nothing to the law,
it should be disposed of from the bench or by
a short written order that may be informative
to the parties but to no one else. Paffel vs.
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986).
There was nothing improper in the use of Rule 31 by the Court
of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed in his Petition to produce any authority
for his positions.

Therefore, this Court should deny certiorari

in this matter.
DATED this

1

day of October,

Randall J. Holmgren I
Attorney for Responden
19
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In Lunsford vs. Waldrip, 493 P.2d 789 at 792 (Wash. App.
1972), the Washington Court of Appeals stated:
The paramount concern in such matters
[suspending visitation] is the welfare of the
child, and the conduct of the father as it
affects the child's welfare is a proper
consideration for the trial court.
How can it be in the best interest of any child to be raised by a
parent who refuses, unless faced with jail or suspension of
visitation, to pay any support to help provide food, clothing,
shelter, etc. for that child?

In the present case, the district

court found that Plaintiff was educated, healthy and able to
provide the ordered support and that Plaintiff had not given the
district court any reason whatsoever as to why Plaintiff had not
paid the support as ordered.
Slade vs. Slade. 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), was an action by
a father to establish visitation rights with his child who was born
out of wedlock and the Utah Supreme Court found that "visitation
is a matter addressed to the district court's sound discretion",
fSlade at 901).
In West vs. West, 487 P. 2d 96 (Or. App. 1971), the case
involved an order by the trial court conditioning the father's
visitation upon the father paying the court ordered child support.
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "the right of visitation
cannot be made dependent upon the payment of support for children
....".

However, the court upheld the trial court's order:

[T]he order was set for the purpose of
bringing home to the defendant a sense of
responsibility for the child. (West at 98)
Soderbura vs. Soderbura. 299 P.2d 479 (Idaho 1956), is a case
where the father petitioned the trial court for a restraining order
so that the children's mother could not transport the children out
of the court's jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's reliance on Smith vs. Smith. 135 Utah Adv. Rep.
33 (Utah App. 1990) is inappropriate because the language quoted
by Plaintiff refers to a situation where a party sought a change
in custody because the other party had interfered with visitation
rights.
Plaintiff's reliance on Dana vs. Dana. 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76
(Utah App. 1990) is similarly mistaken because the visitation issue
in that case focused on the mother's complaint that the father did
not exercise visitation and she wanted him to be ordered to comply
with the visitation schedule or be ordered to pay additional child
support to offset her babysitting expenses.

